Selection bias — where it appears
Named by 27 essays across 16 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
The data that stops early
A subject still event-free when a study ends is not missing and not observed. It is known to exceed something, which is a third state most tools have no slot for — and the two obvious ways of forcing it into one are wrong by 31 and 13 percentage points.
Three mechanisms and one dataset
Four rules for which outcomes go missing, each calibrated to lose the same 35% of the rows and each leaning on what it reads with the same coefficient. Three leave the fitted slope exactly where it was, and the one that reads the outcome moves it by 0.163531.
The rule that can be guessed
A balancing rule improves as it becomes more deterministic, and a deterministic rule can be worked out in advance from information the person enrolling the patient already has. At full determinism 87.6% of assignments are guessable, and an investigator who acts on the guess produces a treatment effect of three quarters of a standard deviation where the truth is zero.
Dropping the incomplete rows
Push the missingness until the rows that survive have a covariate mean of 0.543905 against a population zero and a variance of 0.5041 against one, and the fitted slope is still exactly right. Where the rule reads the outcome instead, the same sweep takes coverage to 2.42% at eight hundred rows.
Dropping the losers
Carrying the best of eight arms forward and testing it at 1.96 rejects a true null 10.3% of the time — the hypothesis was chosen by looking at the data, so the statistic is a maximum wearing a single comparison's clothes. The value that holds the rate is 2.313, and it has to be solved for.
Regression to the mean
Select the worst performers, measure them again, and they improve. Select the best and they decline. No intervention is required for either, the size of the apparent effect is predictable from the correlation alone, and it is the reason so many things appear to work.
The effect a stopped trial reports
An O'Brien–Fleming trial at 88.45% power holds its error rate exactly and reports an effect 9.6% too large on average. The 11.39% of trials that stop at the second look report 1.83 times the truth, the ones that cross at the last look report 0.80 times it, and pooling every trial by its size gives the truth back to the last digit.
The correction that makes the estimate worse
Correcting for twenty analyses repairs the p-value by demanding a larger statistic, and a larger statistic is a more selected one. At two standard errors the surviving estimate averages 1.35 times the truth before the correction and 1.69 times it after — so the honest error rate is bought with a more inflated effect.
Guessing one arm in three
A balancing rule is guessable because it is balancing. With three arms the next assignment is worked out less often than with two — and by more, relative to what a guesser gets for nothing, and the damage they can do is almost unchanged.
The estimate after the choice
An arm chosen for being ahead is ahead by more than it should be, and the trial then publishes the average of the stage that chose it and the stage that did not. The unbiased estimate is the one built from a third of the data — and it is the least accurate of the three.
The interval after the choice
Estimating the coefficients of a known model costs a 95% forecast interval about two points of coverage. Choosing which coefficients to estimate, from the same forty observations, costs another four and a half — so the step nobody records in the output is the more expensive of the two.
What a design chosen from the data costs
Two earlier measurements found what happens when a rule reads the data, and the error rate broke both times. A design that reads the data to decide where to put its runs breaks nothing — and the control that proves it also finds what the real shortfall is.
Whose effect it is
With a perfectly valid instrument and no violation of anything, the estimate converges on 1.1000 where the population average effect is 0.5000. The gap is exactly θ(1 − p_c), the always-takers and never-takers cancel out of both halves of the ratio, and five per cent defiers move the answer to 1.2667.
Every patient at one half
A randomised trial in which the treatment halves every patient's hazard, and patients differ only in their baseline risk. The unadjusted Cox hazard ratio is 0.524 after six months of follow-up, 0.635 after three years and 0.679 after seven, and the ratio of the arms' hazards at a single moment climbs from 0.50 to 0.929 and falls back. Nothing is confounded and nothing is wrong. Survival removes high-risk patients from the control arm faster, and a hazard ratio compares whoever is left.
The sample is a condition
Two independent standard normals, selected on their sum exceeding its median, read a correlation of exactly −1/(π − 1) = −0.4669 inside the sample. Nothing is measured badly and nothing is missing — and both halves of that split read it, in the same direction, while the population containing both reads zero.
The measurement that got them enrolled
Enrol the top tenth of one screening reading and give them nothing, and they fall by 0.702 standard deviations at follow-up. Measured from a fresh reading taken after enrolment they fall by nothing. Averaging ten screening readings still leaves 0.101, and it takes twenty-one to get under 0.05.
A simulation that stops when it looks settled
A simulation of an interval that covers exactly 95%, checked every 250 replications for a significant departure and stopped when it finds one, flags that correct interval on 29.54% of runs. Stopped instead as soon as its estimate reaches 95%, it reports an interval that covers 94% as meeting its level on 37.21% of runs. Stopped when the estimate stops moving, it reports the right number — and has quietly chosen to run about fifteen hundred replications.
Shrinking the arm that was chosen
A trial that carries the best of eight arms forward reports it as better than it is — by +0.123 when the eight arms are alike — and its second stage alone is unbiased but the least accurate of the estimates. Pulling the chosen arm's first stage back towards the eight arms' mean before combining removes most of the bias when the arms are alike (+0.020) and gives the smallest error of any estimate, 0.133 against the published 0.182. When one arm really is ahead by half a standard deviation, the same shrinkage pulls the true winner back towards the losers and understates it by 0.103, with more error than the published estimate. The weight is estimated from eight numbers, and it is right when the selection was noise and wrong when the selection was right.
A guesser who sees the totals
The bound on how guessable a three-arm minimisation is assumes an investigator who sees everything. One who sees only the arm totals — what a drug-supply screen shows — names the next arm 54.5% of the time against a chance 33.3%, and manufactures 45% of the full guesser's bias.
A lead that a heavy tail keeps
Four populations whose readings all correlate at exactly 0.6, and whose least-squares slopes all read 0.6. Select the top one per cent on one reading and measure them again: they keep 60% of their lead if the true scores are normal, 76.1% if they are Laplace, 78.4% if they are a t on four degrees of freedom — and 44.3% if they are uniform. The correlation predicts the regression of the extremes for one shape of population only.
A prior that lets one arm stand out
Shrinking the chosen arm of eight under a normal prior understates a genuine winner by 0.103. A t prior on three degrees of freedom with the same spread understates it by 0.101 — the tail is too far out to reach a lead of three and a half standard errors. A prior with a fifth of its weight on a vague component understates it by 0.073, costs 0.010 of bias when the arms are alike, and still has more error than the unshrunk estimate. With sixteen arms the same mixture recovers three fifths of the loss, because a bell of fifteen shows its outlier; with eight, the arms put more than half their posterior weight on 'one stands out' in 0.4% of trials where one does.
The list it was chosen on
Six functions of one covariate looked like 720 designs, one per order of addition. The rule reads a span and not a sequence, so they are 63, and at a hundred units the best four leave 12.1% of a coin's imbalance against the designer's first four at 31.5%. Those best four contain no cube and are, function for function, the four shapes the worst case was scored on. Read on six shapes it was not told about, the same design leaves the cube 77.0% of a coin's imbalance, and the designer's four, which lost by a factor of two and a half, leave it 28.1%.
The guesser who learns
An investigator who watches a three-arm minimisation can tally which of several partial readings has been right so far and follow the leader. It does not help. Following the leader names 48.9% of assignments where the best single reading names 49.9%, and a table of what the three readings say together, learned inside the trial, starts at 36% and has not caught up by a hundred and fifty patients. Learned over earlier trials, that table reaches 54.5%. The full guesser's 71.8% stays out of reach of all of them, because the gap to it is information rather than practice.
The slope of a density nobody can see
Tweedie's formula corrects a reading by the slope of the readings' own log-density, and a study has its readings. Estimated from a thousand of them, the correction for the top one per cent beats the correlation's linear rule on 84.0% to 98.0% of studies from heavy-tailed populations and on 75.0% to 81.5% from a bounded one — and costs an error of 0.09 to 0.12 where the population is normal and the rule was already exact. At 250 readings the log-spline loses to the rule it replaces, and at 16,000 the same log-spline gets worse on a power tail.
The run that confirms it
The setting a response-surface analysis recommends was chosen because the fitted surface was highest there, so the height the fit predicts at it is a maximum over a random field. At twice the noise the fit predicts 0.858 more than is there — 0.72 of the prediction's own standard error — and the gap is not noise, it is the selection.
A second stage sized by the first
A drop-the-losers trial can size its second stage by what the first stage says about the arms' shape — more patients when the chosen arm's lead looks like luck, fewer when it looks real. The rule does what it was built to do: at sixteen arms with a genuine winner it spends 51.0 patients a group when the interim chose the wrong arm and 24.2 when it chose the right one. And it buys nothing. Against a fixed second stage of the same average size, every estimate of the chosen arm errs by the same to within a few thousandths; the published combination's bias rises from 0.014 to 0.022, and the second stage alone, still unbiased, errs by 0.319 against 0.281.
Patients spent before the choice
A trial that picks the best of eight arms and then confirms it splits its patients between choosing and estimating, and the familiar shape — sixty an arm before the choice, thirty after — spends ninety per cent of a six-hundred-patient budget on the choice. Measured against the effect a reader is told about, the best arm's, that split is nearly right when one arm is modestly ahead and twice as wrong as it needs to be when the arms are alike. A split of thirty-two an arm before the choice is never more than 21.3% worse than the best split for whichever world holds; sixty an arm can be 98.8% worse. The two targets an estimate could serve — the chosen arm's effect and the best arm's — pull the split in opposite directions, and only one of them is what gets published.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Monte CarloClosed formThe winner's curseAdaptive designMean squared errorShrinkageCovariate-adaptive randomisationInterim analysisMinimisationRegression to the meanBlindingConditional distribution