Adaptive design — where it appears
Named by 15 essays across 4 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
Choosing n after looking
Re-estimating the sample size from an interim is the one adaptation with a defence, and the defence is exactly what it costs: an analyst kept blind to the arms measures a spread that contains the effect, so the design overshoots by 1 + Δ²/4σ². Re-estimating the effect instead breaks the error rate.
The experiments that could have happened
An adaptive trial's allocation is a function of the outcomes it will later be compared against, so the ordinary analysis rejects a true null 9.2% of the time. Hold the outcomes fixed, re-run the rule that assigned them, and count — the same statistic against a reference distribution the trial could actually have drawn from is back at 4.0%.
Randomising towards the winner
Allocating more patients to the arm that is doing better is the humane thing to want and it buys nothing statistically: at a fixed total it costs thirty points of power. And because the allocation is a function of the outcomes, the ordinary test on it rejects a true null 7.8% of the time before any time trend is applied — and 58% after one.
The test that needs the rule
A randomisation test assumes almost nothing about the data and one thing about the experiment. Tell it a fair coin produced an allocation that an adaptive rule produced — which is what every off-the-shelf permutation routine does — and it rejects 8.0% of true nulls where knowing the rule gives 4.0%.
Dropping the losers
Carrying the best of eight arms forward and testing it at 1.96 rejects a true null 10.3% of the time — the hypothesis was chosen by looking at the data, so the statistic is a maximum wearing a single comparison's clothes. The value that holds the rate is 2.313, and it has to be solved for.
The design that stops guessing
Every repair so far protects a guess. The alternative is to run part of the experiment, estimate the parameter from it, and design the rest at the estimate — which recovers most of what a threefold wrong guess costs, and has a best moment to stop guessing that is earlier than anyone expects.
The plus one and the round number
A sampled randomisation test counts the observed allocation as one of its own reference draws, and the correction is invisible at B = 19, 39, 59 and 999 — every value anybody uses. At B = 20 the version without it is an 8.00% test where the corrected one is 3.80%, and the convention protecting everybody is a preference for round numbers minus one.
The estimate after the choice
An arm chosen for being ahead is ahead by more than it should be, and the trial then publishes the average of the stage that chose it and the stage that did not. The unbiased estimate is the one built from a third of the data — and it is the least accurate of the three.
What a design chosen from the data costs
Two earlier measurements found what happens when a rule reads the data, and the error rate broke both times. A design that reads the data to decide where to put its runs breaks nothing — and the control that proves it also finds what the real shortfall is.
What the exactness buys
Against a z test calibrated to reject exactly 5% of true nulls on this design, the randomisation test loses nineteen points of power. What it buys is that the calibration needs the success rate — which moves the critical value from 1.668 to 2.718 and is the quantity the trial was run to find out.
Shrinking the arm that was chosen
A trial that carries the best of eight arms forward reports it as better than it is — by +0.123 when the eight arms are alike — and its second stage alone is unbiased but the least accurate of the estimates. Pulling the chosen arm's first stage back towards the eight arms' mean before combining removes most of the bias when the arms are alike (+0.020) and gives the smallest error of any estimate, 0.133 against the published 0.182. When one arm really is ahead by half a standard deviation, the same shrinkage pulls the true winner back towards the losers and understates it by 0.103, with more error than the published estimate. The weight is estimated from eight numbers, and it is right when the selection was noise and wrong when the selection was right.
A prior that lets one arm stand out
Shrinking the chosen arm of eight under a normal prior understates a genuine winner by 0.103. A t prior on three degrees of freedom with the same spread understates it by 0.101 — the tail is too far out to reach a lead of three and a half standard errors. A prior with a fifth of its weight on a vague component understates it by 0.073, costs 0.010 of bias when the arms are alike, and still has more error than the unshrunk estimate. With sixteen arms the same mixture recovers three fifths of the loss, because a bell of fifteen shows its outlier; with eight, the arms put more than half their posterior weight on 'one stands out' in 0.4% of trials where one does.
A second stage sized by the first
A drop-the-losers trial can size its second stage by what the first stage says about the arms' shape — more patients when the chosen arm's lead looks like luck, fewer when it looks real. The rule does what it was built to do: at sixteen arms with a genuine winner it spends 51.0 patients a group when the interim chose the wrong arm and 24.2 when it chose the right one. And it buys nothing. Against a fixed second stage of the same average size, every estimate of the chosen arm errs by the same to within a few thousandths; the published combination's bias rises from 0.014 to 0.022, and the second stage alone, still unbiased, errs by 0.319 against 0.281.
A look added by a rule
A monitoring committee's rule — add a look at three quarters of the trial when the interim |z| is at least 1.5 — spends 5.2323% under O'Brien–Fleming-type boundaries. Written into the protocol it can be given boundaries that spend exactly 5%, three ways: raise the added look's boundaries by 2.05%, raise every later boundary by 0.99%, or preserve at each interim value the chance of crossing the plan would have given. All three cost the same, 0.38 points of power, from 88.94% to 88.56%, because the power the uncorrected rule seemed to keep was the excess error. Made exact, the rule is a design between the two fixed schedules — and at every trigger slightly better than randomising between them.
Patients spent before the choice
A trial that picks the best of eight arms and then confirms it splits its patients between choosing and estimating, and the familiar shape — sixty an arm before the choice, thirty after — spends ninety per cent of a six-hundred-patient budget on the choice. Measured against the effect a reader is told about, the best arm's, that split is nearly right when one arm is modestly ahead and twice as wrong as it needs to be when the arms are alike. A split of thirty-two an arm before the choice is never more than 21.3% worse than the best split for whichever world holds; sixty an arm can be 98.8% worse. The two targets an estimate could serve — the chosen arm's effect and the best arm's — pull the split in opposite directions, and only one of them is what gets published.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Error rateSelection biasExperimental designMean squared errorTwo-stage designThe winner's curseEmpirical BayesInterim analysisp-valueRandomisation testReference distributionSample size