The winner's curse — where it appears
Named by 20 essays across 10 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
A criterion is a prediction of the hold-out
A rolling hold-out spends half the sample measuring what a criterion computes from all of it. Against an oracle that is arithmetic rather than an estimate, the criterion gives up 0.01701 and the hold-out 0.03200 — and the number the hold-out reports for its own winner is optimistic by more than either.
Five times in six
A 95% interval is read as a 95% chance that a replication's estimate will land inside it. With the spread known and a replication of the same size, the chance is 83.42% — five times in six — because both estimates are uncertain. An original that landed two standard errors from the truth captures a replication 48.40% of the time; a replication a tenth the size lands inside 44.54% of the time; and among significant originals from studies with 17% power, 66.94%.
The winner's curse
Filter honest studies down to the ones that reached significance and the effects they report are systematically too large. At low power the inflation is a factor of two, nobody has done anything wrong, and the selection did all of it.
The effect a stopped trial reports
An O'Brien–Fleming trial at 88.45% power holds its error rate exactly and reports an effect 9.6% too large on average. The 11.39% of trials that stop at the second look report 1.83 times the truth, the ones that cross at the last look report 0.80 times it, and pooling every trial by its size gives the truth back to the last digit.
The correction that makes the estimate worse
Correcting for twenty analyses repairs the p-value by demanding a larger statistic, and a larger statistic is a more selected one. At two standard errors the surviving estimate averages 1.35 times the truth before the correction and 1.69 times it after — so the honest error rate is bought with a more inflated effect.
Significant in one, not in the other
Two studies of exactly the same effect, each with 50% power, disagree about significance half the time — and when they do, the test of the difference between them is significant in 9.75% of cases. A p of 0.01 beside a p of 0.20 is a difference with p = 0.36. Among four subgroups sharing one effect, at least one significant and one not happens 87.5% of the time, and the test that would tell a real difference apart needs four times the sample the effect itself needed.
The estimate after the choice
An arm chosen for being ahead is ahead by more than it should be, and the trial then publishes the average of the stage that chose it and the stage that did not. The unbiased estimate is the one built from a third of the data — and it is the least accurate of the three.
The p-value a replication gets
Under a true null a p-value is flat. Under a real effect its distribution is closed form and wide — a study with 80% power returns anything from 4.4×10⁻⁵ to 0.13 in eight runs of ten — and the chance that an exact replication of a p = 0.05 result is significant again is exactly one half, under both of the models people use without naming them.
An interval for the winner
The largest of twenty correlated analyses, reported because it cleared the family-wise threshold, carries an ordinary 95% interval that covers its true mean 75.96% of the time at an effect of two standard errors and never at all when there is no effect. An interval built on the fact that it won covers 94.90% — and it is 2.48 times as wide, excludes zero for only 14.10% of the winners, and has no lower limit at all for 14.32% of them. It restores the promise by declining to say most of what the ordinary interval said.
Shrinking the arm that was chosen
A trial that carries the best of eight arms forward reports it as better than it is — by +0.123 when the eight arms are alike — and its second stage alone is unbiased but the least accurate of the estimates. Pulling the chosen arm's first stage back towards the eight arms' mean before combining removes most of the bias when the arms are alike (+0.020) and gives the smallest error of any estimate, 0.133 against the published 0.182. When one arm really is ahead by half a standard deviation, the same shrinkage pulls the true winner back towards the losers and understates it by 0.103, with more error than the published estimate. The weight is estimated from eight numbers, and it is right when the selection was noise and wrong when the selection was right.
A ratio whose interval has to be the whole line
The delta interval for a ratio of two means covers 95.61% when the denominator is eight standard errors from zero and 1.10% at a ten-thousandth of one, and ten times as wide it still covers only 3.48%. Linearising is not the fault. Gleser and Hwang proved that every interval that is always finite fails the same way, so an interval that keeps its promise has to be the whole line some of the time.
A prior that lets one arm stand out
Shrinking the chosen arm of eight under a normal prior understates a genuine winner by 0.103. A t prior on three degrees of freedom with the same spread understates it by 0.101 — the tail is too far out to reach a lead of three and a half standard errors. A prior with a fifth of its weight on a vague component understates it by 0.073, costs 0.010 of bias when the arms are alike, and still has more error than the unshrunk estimate. With sixteen arms the same mixture recovers three fifths of the loss, because a bell of fifteen shows its outlier; with eight, the arms put more than half their posterior weight on 'one stands out' in 0.4% of trials where one does.
An interval for the analyses admitted to
An analyst runs twenty correlated analyses, admits to one, and reports the winner with an interval conditioned on having cleared 1.96 — the selection as written down rather than as it happened. The interval covers 95.3% of the time, against 95.6% for one conditioned on all twenty, because a winner's truncation point is set by the threshold far more than by its unseen rivals: hiding nineteen analyses moves it by 0.061 on average. What the hiding changes is how often there is a winner at all. With no effect anywhere, a family of twenty produces a reported winner 35.5% of the time against 4.8% when all twenty are admitted, and one whose interval excludes zero 1.48% of the time against 0.13% — the interval keeps its promise and the report does not.
Intervals for the findings
Benjamini–Hochberg's findings usually go out each with its ordinary 95% interval. With ten real effects of two standard errors among twenty tests, 11.59% of those intervals miss their effect, every miss on the far side, and the interval around the most prominent finding covers 72.36% of the time — 2.38% when the effects are one standard error. Intervals widened for the number of findings hold the share that miss under 5%.
The run that confirms it
The setting a response-surface analysis recommends was chosen because the fitted surface was highest there, so the height the fit predicts at it is a maximum over a random field. At twice the noise the fit predicts 0.858 more than is there — 0.72 of the prediction's own standard error — and the gap is not noise, it is the selection.
How slow a return a sample can see
At two hundred observations the test finds a gap that halves in five steps four times in five, one that halves in eight 37.3% of the time, and one that halves in fifty 4.95% of the time — which is the rate at which it finds pairs with no mechanism at all. The boundary moves with the sample, not with its square root.
A second stage sized by the first
A drop-the-losers trial can size its second stage by what the first stage says about the arms' shape — more patients when the chosen arm's lead looks like luck, fewer when it looks real. The rule does what it was built to do: at sixteen arms with a genuine winner it spends 51.0 patients a group when the interim chose the wrong arm and 24.2 when it chose the right one. And it buys nothing. Against a fixed second stage of the same average size, every estimate of the chosen arm errs by the same to within a few thousandths; the published combination's bias rises from 0.014 to 0.022, and the second stage alone, still unbiased, errs by 0.319 against 0.281.
Patients spent before the choice
A trial that picks the best of eight arms and then confirms it splits its patients between choosing and estimating, and the familiar shape — sixty an arm before the choice, thirty after — spends ninety per cent of a six-hundred-patient budget on the choice. Measured against the effect a reader is told about, the best arm's, that split is nearly right when one arm is modestly ahead and twice as wrong as it needs to be when the arms are alike. A split of thirty-two an arm before the choice is never more than 21.3% worse than the best split for whichever world holds; sixty an arm can be 98.8% worse. The two targets an estimate could serve — the chosen arm's effect and the best arm's — pull the split in opposite directions, and only one of them is what gets published.
The height at the chosen setting
The height a response-surface fit predicts at the setting it recommends reads high, because the setting was chosen where the fit was highest. The obvious repair — choose on some runs, estimate on the rest — is impossible in the usual thirteen-run design, which has nine distinct settings where two separate fits need twelve. A parametric bootstrap of the optimism removes four fifths of it at no cost in runs, 0.884 down to 0.183 at twice the noise. With the design run twice, correcting the full fit beats splitting it: an error of 0.924 against 1.213, at a better setting.
An interval that knows its finding was found
An interval for one Benjamini–Hochberg finding can be read from the distribution of its estimate given that it cleared the threshold it had to clear. It covers the finding's effect 94.8% of the time with real effects of two standard errors, against the ordinary interval's 87.0%, and it covers the most prominent finding 91.3% of the time where the ordinary one covers 72.4%. The price is width — a median 5.06 standard errors against 3.92 — and something larger: for three findings in four at that effect size the interval reaches back past zero, so a finding that cleared the line is, once the line is accounted for, not distinguishable from nothing.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Mean squared errorSelection biasStatistical powerConfidence intervalCoverageMonte CarloAdaptive designSample sizeSelection effectShrinkageEmpirical BayesMultiple comparisons