Prior — where it appears
Named by 19 essays across 10 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
Eight groups, one population
Eight hospitals are neither one hospital nor eight unrelated problems. The two obvious answers cost 2.23 and 1.15 in squared error; the estimate between them costs 0.88, and the weight it uses is not a matter of taste.
The design for the worst case
A design for a non-linear model is optimal at a guess about the answer. Averaging over a prior repairs that on average; protecting the worst value in a range is a different problem, with a different answer, and it needs a third setting to reach it.
What the 95% refers to
An interval that claims 95% is making a checkable statement about a procedure, not about the interval in front of you. Build every possible sample and count, and the interval taught first turns out to cover 87.6% of the time.
What a prior is worth
A prior is not a philosophical position, it is a component with a stated size. For a proportion it is worth exactly a + b observations, which turns "how much does the prior matter" from an argument into a subtraction.
What the plug-in forgets
The shrinkage weight needs a population spread, and the population spread has to be estimated from eight numbers. Empirical Bayes estimates it, substitutes it, and proceeds as though it were known — and the interval that comes out covers 79% rather than the 95% it claims.
A prior on the spread
Integrating over the population spread means putting a prior on it, which sounds like the objection rather than the repair. The prior's effect is measurable, it is invisible where the groups are clearly different, and the reflex choice for a scale parameter turns out not to have a posterior at all.
Pooling a proportion
A proportion cannot be shrunk on its own scale — an estimate would leave the interval, and how much information a count carries depends on where it sits. Move to log-odds and the approximation works, at the price of a group that saw nothing having no estimate at all until the correction supplies one.
The weight that decides
B = se²/(se² + τ²) is not a compromise between two answers. It is exactly the posterior mean's weight, it agrees with a numerical integration to ten digits, and an argument that mentions no population at all arrives at almost the same estimator.
What a credible interval covers
A credible interval makes the statement everyone wants and does not claim to have a coverage. It has one anyway, it can be summed over the sample space exactly, and on a reasonable prior it beats the interval taught first.
What a p-value does not say
The same p of 0.04 corresponds to a large effect in ten observations and a negligible one in two thousand. A p-value alone cannot be interpreted, and the number that makes it interpretable is almost never printed beside it.
What a positive test is worth
A test that is 90% sensitive and 95% specific sounds accurate. For a condition affecting one person in a thousand, 98% of its positive results are wrong, and a worse test on a commoner condition beats a better test on a rare one.
The chance a trial succeeds
A trial of sixty-four per arm has 80% power at an effect of half a standard deviation. If the effect is only believed to be about half a standard deviation, give or take a quarter, the chance the trial reaches significance is 69.2%; give or take a half, 61.4%. Reaching 80% then takes 113 per arm, or 1,268 — and when the belief is uncertain by three quarters of a standard deviation no number of patients reaches 80%, because the chance can never exceed the 74.8% probability that the effect is positive at all.
The prior the data estimates
A hierarchical model needs a population spread, and it does not ask for one. It reads τ off the distance between the group means — biased six per cent low, exactly zero on 53% of datasets where the groups are identical — and the prior stops being a belief.
Where the two schools agree
With a flat prior on a normal mean, the credible interval and the confidence interval are the same interval, endpoint for endpoint. Knowing exactly when that stops being true is more useful than either camp's general argument.
The base rate was always Bayes
The screening arithmetic everybody finds counter-intuitive is a posterior update with a prior of one in a thousand. Naming it that way turns a famous puzzle into an instance of a rule, and makes the sequential version obvious.
The design that hedges
A locally optimal design is right at one value of the unknown and 23.9% efficient at the edge of a sixteenfold range. Averaging the criterion over a prior instead buys the worst case back to 56.3% — and buys it by adding support points, at spreads the arithmetic decides rather than the experimenter — a third setting at a factor of 3.36 and a fourth at 8.86.
The interval that integrates
A credible interval for one group in a hierarchy has to average over every value the population spread might take. That averaging is what makes it cover — 95.2% against the plug-in's 78.8% — and it costs 31% more width, a heavier tail, and a mixture rather than a normal.
The p-value a replication gets
Under a true null a p-value is flat. Under a real effect its distribution is closed form and wide — a study with 80% power returns anything from 4.4×10⁻⁵ to 0.13 in eight runs of ten — and the chance that an exact replication of a p = 0.05 result is significant again is exactly one half, under both of the models people use without naming them.
When the prior is confident and wrong
A prior worth thirty-five observations, centred in the wrong place, produces a 95% interval that covers nothing at all — and reports a width 5% narrower than an honest one. It takes seventeen thousand observations to repair, not thirty-five, and the worst study to run is the one whose sample size equals the prior's weight, exactly.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
PosteriorFlat priorCoverageSample sizeShrinkageCredible intervalHierarchical modelPartial poolingEmpirical BayesPosterior meanPrior sensitivityEffect size