Normal Distribution
nothing is called 95% until it has been counted
Field

Designs that change while they run

The stopping-rule field is a fixed design looked at more than once. Here the design itself is a function of the data — how many units, which arm the next one goes to, which arms survive the interim — and the question stops being what the rule spends and becomes what it leaves behind. The estimate from an arm chosen for being ahead is ahead by more than it should be, and the unbiased estimate is the one that throws away the data the choice was made on.
What the interim sees, at an effect of 1. The same 60 observations, estimated two ways. Keeping the arms separate gives 0.995, which is σ. Pooling them without separating the arms — the price of staying blind to the comparison — gives 1.114, against the identity √(1 + Δ²/4σ²) = 1.118. The sample size is proportional to the variance, so a blinded design at this effect asks for 25% more units than it needs, and it does so systematically rather than by chance.

Choosing n after looking

Re-estimating the sample size from an interim is the one adaptation with a defence, and the defence is exactly what it costs: an analyst kept blind to the arms measures a spread that contains the effect, so the design overshoots by 1 + Δ²/4σ². Re-estimating the effect instead breaks the error rate.

 20 adaptive trials, 45% against 25%. Each line is one trial allocating patients one at a time by the arm's own posterior. The average final share on the better arm is 84.7%, with a standard deviation of 10.3 points across these 20 trials. The rule does not deliver a fixed advantage: it delivers one that depends on how the first few patients came out.

Randomising towards the winner

Allocating more patients to the arm that is doing better is the humane thing to want and it buys nothing statistically: at a fixed total it costs thirty points of power. And because the allocation is a function of the outcomes, the ordinary test on it rejects a true null 7.8% of the time before any time trend is applied — and 58% after one.

 The best of 8 arms, tested as though it were the only one. 8,000 trials with no effect in any arm. Stage one runs 8 arms at 60 each, the best is carried forward, and stage two adds 30 more to it and to the control. The histogram is where the final statistic lands and the curve is the standard normal it is being read against — shifted right, because the arm was chosen for being ahead. 10.5% of these trials clear 1.96 against a claimed 5%, and the value that actually holds the rate for this design is 2.313.

Dropping the losers

Carrying the best of eight arms forward and testing it at 1.96 rejects a true null 10.3% of the time — the hypothesis was chosen by looking at the data, so the statistic is a maximum wearing a single comparison's clothes. The value that holds the rate is 2.313, and it has to be solved for.

 Three estimates of the same effect, and the honest one is the worst. 8,000 trials in which every arm has an effect of exactly 0. The arm carried forward is reported by its first stage at +0.187 above the truth — it was chosen for being ahead — and by its second stage at -0.0032, which is unbiased by construction because the selection could not see it. The combination that gets published is at 0.123, exactly the share of the first stage's bias the first stage contributes. Root mean squared error: 0.240, 0.261, 0.182 — the unbiased estimate is the least accurate of the three.

The estimate after the choice

An arm chosen for being ahead is ahead by more than it should be, and the trial then publishes the average of the stage that chose it and the stage that did not. The unbiased estimate is the one built from a third of the data — and it is the least accurate of the three.

All essays