Sequential testing — where it appears
Named by 5 essays across 5 fields — each of them below, with the objects they name alongside it.
When the looking happens
A p-value is defined relative to a sampling plan, so the same data means different things under different stopping rules. Testing five times at the nominal level rejects a true null 14% of the time, and no observation in the dataset changed.
The second test that is not a second opinion
Two positives from a 90/95 test on a one-in-a-thousand condition give a 24.49% chance of disease if the tests are independent. At a correlation of 0.1 between their errors it is 10.16%, and at 0.5 it is 3.16% — barely more than the 1.77% one positive was worth.
The base rate was always Bayes
The screening arithmetic everybody finds counter-intuitive is a posterior update with a prior of one in a thousand. Naming it that way turns a famous puzzle into an instance of a rule, and makes the sequential version obvious.
A simulation that stops when it looks settled
A simulation of an interval that covers exactly 95%, checked every 250 replications for a significant departure and stopped when it finds one, flags that correct interval on 29.54% of runs. Stopped instead as soon as its estimate reaches 95%, it reports an interval that covers 94% as meeting its level on 37.21% of runs. Stopped when the estimate stops moving, it reports the right number — and has quietly chosen to run about fifteen hundred replications.
The rank is a decision
The sequential procedure's 5% bounds one of its two errors. Over-counting reads between 4.2% and 7.2% at every sample length from fifty observations to three hundred; under-counting reads 69.5% at fifty and 0.0% at three hundred, and nothing in the procedure bounds it.
Named alongside it
The objects these essays reach for when they reach for this one.
Error ratePosteriorBase rateInterim analysisMonte Carlop-valuePredictive valueRandom walkScreeningStatistical powerThe Bayes factorBinomial proportion